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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH COUNTY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
CASE NO. 900347
JIMMIE N. REIDHEAD, NYLE C.
BIGELOW, GLENN McKEE, Uintah
County Commissioners, WESTERN
SURETY CO., bondsman
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was filed pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12
by

the Uintah

against

the

County Attorney,

three

Defendant

in the name

Commissioners

of Uintah County,

and

their

bondsman,

praying for recovery of damages for the County in the amount of
$13,000.00, alleging that the Defendant Commissioners had awarded
a

contract

to Arlo

Dean

dba

Arlo's M

& R

in

the

amount

of

$62,985.00 which was more than double the lowest bid of $28,000.00
without preparing specifications and advertising as required by law
and without requiring a performance bond.

Defendants answered by

denying the allegations and moved for Summary Judgment asserting
the actions of the Defendant were taken in good faith.

Depositions

were taken, affidavits filed and following oral argument, Judge
Dennis L. Draney of the Eighth Judicial District Court of Uintah
County, statement after which Judge Draney awarded Summary Judgment

to Defendants stating that no evidence was shown of bad faith on
the part of Defendants and that Defendants were entitled to Summary
Judgment as a matter of law, of which Judgment Appellant Appeals.
(Appellant

will

refer to the facts in more detail

in its

argument and when it does so, it will cite the particular reference
by page or otherwise from the record.)
STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant text of statues and rules pertinent to resolving this
case will be cited here and verbatim text included in an addendum
attached hereto.

These are as follows:

1.

Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12

2.

Utah Code Annotated 17-15-3

3.

Utah Code Annotated 14-1-18

4.

Utah Code Annotated 63-56-38(1)(a)

5.

Rule 56 of U.R.C.P.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This action is brought by the Uintah County Attorney pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12 of the Laws of the State of Utah in
the

name

of

Uintah

County

against

the

three

Uintah

County

Commissioners and their Bondsman, seeking to recover damages for
the County in the amount of $13,000.00 as a result of the said
Uintah County Commission awarding a contract for the repair of the
Uintah County Court roof and Uintah County Care Center Roof in the

2

amount of $62,985.00 to Arlo Dean, dba Arlo's M & R, an unlicensed
contractor and without preparing specifications and advertising
bids as required by law (Utah Code Annotated 17-15-3) and without
requiring

a performance

bond

Annotated

14-1-8) and providing workman's compensation

employees as required by law.

as

required

by

law,

(Utah

Code

for his

Also, in view of the fact that the

said bid was more than two times the lowest

bid submitted of

$28,000.00, awarded Judgment to Defendant of which Judgment the
Plaintiff appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
1.

Does the evidence presented show conclusively that when

viewed in the most favorable light there is no issue of material
fact remaining such as would preclude Defendant and Appellees being
awarded a Summary Judgment as a matter of law?
2.

In the exercise of a discretionary duty can it be said

that Defendants acted in good faith when they knowingly and in a
manner showing gross negligence awarded this contract and therefore
removed the shield of Immunity for their actions?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant

will

take

exception

to

the

Court's

ruling,

contending with detailed references therefrom that record of the
case will show several issues that will raise questions of law that

3

cannot be summarily disposed of in view of the fact that viewed in
a light most favorable to the party opposing Summary Judgment there
are no material facts at issue.
issues

that

will

In summary Appellant notes several

be discussed

and

elaborated

with

particular

reference in its detailed argument.
Appellant

will

further

argue

that

sufficient

facts

and

precedent may be alluded to show that even though the Commissioners
were performing a discretionary duty, that they knowingly exercised
the same in a manner that was a clear violation of the law and
therefore they lost their shield of immunity under the laws and the
same actions manifest a gross negligence

from an issue may be

raised that they have not acted in good faith.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE COURT'S RULING DOES NOT SHOW CONCLUSIVELY THAT THERE
ARE NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAINING TO BE DECIDED AND
THEREFORE, DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Before approaching specifically this issue, Appellant makes
the

following

general

observations.

It

will

be

noted

that

according to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that a
moving party is entitled to Summary Judgment which states (noting
the pertinent portion of Rule 56(c)
"The
Judgment
sought
shall
be
rendered
forthwith, if the pleadings, depositions,
answers, interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
4

material fact and the moving party is entitled
to Judgment as a matter of law."
Viewing the matter in further context the Court has held that
in rendering Summary Judgment, it is not to determine the weight
of

the

testimony

or

credibility

of

witnesses

(Singleton

v.

Alexander, 19 U 2d 291, 431 P2d 126; Sandburg v Klien, 576 P2d
1201).

Moreover, the Court is not to determine what the facts are

but must note whether there is a material issue of fact (Hill ex
rel

Fooel

v

Grand

Central

Inc..

25 U2d

121,

477

P2d 150).

Similarly any issue of Doubt is to be resolved in favor of the
opposing

party

(Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P2d 434).

Having

viewed the ruling of the Court in the light of these observations,
Appellant finds from the pleadings on file several issues material
fact upon which a question of whether Defendants acted in good
faith might be raised.
A question of material fact was presented with respect, when
as a defense that the Commission was to follow the policy and
procedures of the County with regard to the same, the record shows
they did not follow that procedure as evidenced by the testimony
of

the

proposals

solicited

in

response

to a question

bids, or was asked about

bids, he

negative (Deposition Dean Pope, P. 4-5).

as to whether he
responded

in the

Moreover, he was asked

about preparing bids, he indicated were prepared by Jim Shewell
(Deposition Dean Pope, P. 5) and again referring to page 6 of the
same

deposition

the

following
5

is

noted:

that

he

made

no

consultation with the bidders (P. 6) he issued purchase orders for
the contractor, after the contractor had taken the bid (P. 7 of the
same).
The minutes of the Commission Meeting reveal that the bid was
purportedly awarded to Arlo's M & R, yet only the labor was awarded
to

him,

the

materials

were

contracted

Commission Meeting, August 8, 1989).

to

SWEPCO

(Minutes

of

Referring to the deposition

of Jim Shewell, Building Superintendent, we noted the following in
response to Defendants question:
Q.
A.

And then, subsequent to that did you have
any, it didn't involve only labor?
When we came to signing the contract
and writing the P.O.'s is when it
came out and Dean was upset over it
because he says the County doesn't
do business that way." (P. 11 Dean
Pope is County Purchasing Agent)

Further in the same deposition he testified, referring to Dean
Pope, "he indicated the County didn't do business that way, that
usually

it

mentioned

represented

the total

to the Commissioners

cost

and so

I guess

it was

and through Glen and that they

agreed to go where the County would purchase the materials and just
make P.O.'s

(P. 11).

These facts should be noted in view of the

fact that at Commissioner McKee's urging they had met with Arlo
Dean prior to the awarding of the bid (Arlo Dean's Affidavit on
file).
The affidavits of all three Commissioners indicate that they
delegated the authority to prepare specifications for bids to Jim
6

Shewell and Dean Pope, authority that is derived from Utah Code
Annotated 17-15-4, and noting appointment under this section it
must be inferred that they were aware of Utah Code Annotated 1715-3 that relates to requirements of advertising and performance
bond for all bids.
Finally, the record shows that both Commissioner Bigelow (Nyle
Bigelow Deposition P.13) noted that an attempt was made to rescind
the agreement with Arlo Dean and have him perform under proxy
contract with Loran Allred (confirmed deposition Glen McKee, P 1819) and Affidavit of Arlo Dean:
From these facts and more there are issues raised that would
preclude granting of Summary Judgment on the assumption there was
no issue of a material fact relating to good faith exercised of
their discretion,
POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS, WHILE PERFORMING A DISCRETIONARY DUTY, KNOWINGLY
EXERCISED THAT DISCRETION ARBITRARILY IN AN ILLEGAL AND ARBITRARY
MANNER AND THEREFORE SUCH IS EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF GOOD FIATH,
REMOVING THE SHIELD OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY THAT COVERS THEM AND THE
EXERCISE OF THAT DUTY.
In approaching the question as to whether the Commissioners
acted performing a discretionary duty rather than administerial
duty.

Appellant concedes and further concurs with the established

Utah law that accords a qualified immunity to public officials when
they so act (Snvder v. Merkley, 693 P2d 64; Salt Lake County v.
Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P 1075).
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But, the Courts have ruled that

Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P 1075).
not

even

a

discretionary

But, the Courts have ruled that

function

is

to

be

exercised

in

an

arbitrary manner quoting the Court, ruling on another question the
following is noted:
"[Discretion. . .does
not
mean
absolute
arbitrary power.
The discretion must be
exercised in a reasonable manner, and not
maliciously, wantonly, arbitrarily to the wrong
and injury of another" (Murphy v. Grand County,
1 U2d 412, 68 P2d 677)
While

the

ruling

and

facts

of

that

case

are

not

quite

applicable in the instant situation, the case does suggest that in
awarding contracts in an overt improper manner, such unreasonable
action constitutes an abuse of discretion.

While a perusal of the

cases of jurisdictions implying the "good faith immunity" there is
a

tendency

"to

defer

to

the

Judgment

and

actions

of

public

officials."
Yet, there have been some exceptions notably a North Carolina
case relating to expenditure of public funds improperly spent on
a contract not let out for public bid and ruling on a verdict of
a jury that the public official involved the Mayor, "unlawfully,
willfully, and knowingly let...(the contract) with the intent to
evade the law with regard to advertisements and public letting of
municipal contracts" (Moore v. Lambeth 207 N.C. 23 175 S.E. 714 at
175

S.E.

715)

the

Court

rejected

the Mayor's

claim

that

no

liability attached because his actions were taken in his official
capacity which contention the North Carolina Court rejected because

8

the Plaintiff's ere not seeking recovery as individuals but were
acting in behalf of the City.
With regard to the question of good faith, there is a dearth
of case law delineating what is implied by the term, but a Georgia
Court attempted definition when it stated that:
f,

[b]ad faith is not simply bad judgment or
negligence but imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and implies conscious
doing of wrong, and means a breach of known
duty through some motive of interest or ill
will.
"Bad faith" though and indefinite term, differs
from the negative idea of negligence, in that
it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with a furtive design or some motive
or interest of ill will."
Following the case law, there seems to be no cases directly
ruling on the question of whether bad faith may be attributed to
grossly negligent conduct, in a Montana Case (Goetschius v. Lasich,
138 Mont.

465,

353

P2d

87), they

alluded

to

this

fact

when

landowners sued the County Commission for flood damage allegedly
arising from the County's construction of a drainage ditch, the
Court noted action would not lie for the "[1] negligent performance
of an official duty, which is judicial and discretionary in its
nature, however gross or corrupt such neglect maybe..."
however

authority

to

the

effect

that

officers

There is
exercising

discretionary powers may be held liable for...a gross neglect of
duty."

9

Albeit, the Court did not find gross negligence in this case
nor has it been subsequently

followed.

Further

a doctrine of

immunity has developed which shields public officials form civil
liability

insofar

as

their

conduct

does

not

violate

clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable
person would have known.
shield

of immunity

But, this doctrine serves to remove the

when an official

is aware of the statutory

standard to which he is expected to adhere. (Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800).
While this doctrine has not been extended beyond the area of
monetary
Sampson

damages
v. King

in

constitutional

693 F2d

rights

violations

566, Green v. White,

693 F2d

(see

eg

45) by

analogous might extend to the case at bar.
In summonation, in applying the "good faith" exception to the
case at bar, we have an anomaly not apparent in most of the cases
of issue.

In the cases of Snvder v. Merklev, 693 P2d 64, and Salt

Lake v. Clinton, 30 Utah 462, we are dealing with matters of a
single infraction, but in the present case, not only do we have an
instance of the Commissioners letting a bid with public notice, to
an unlicensed contractor, for an amount more than double the lowest
bid,

without

a

written

contract,

but

the

Commissioners

misrepresented the bid by announcing the bid was for the whole of
the contract, when it was merely for labor, then in violation of
its own policies and procedures, it committed the County to issuing

10

circumvent

and

cover

up

its

error

by

drafting

a

rescission

agreement and arranging for the original contractor to perform on
a proxy contract.

In this, anomalous situation where there was a

persistent disregard of known laws and policy, the breach is so
gross and flagrant that the Court could find there is grounds for
inferring the Commission did not act in good faith.

CONCLUSION
In recapping the previous discussion; it will be noted that
the Court

ruled for Summary Judgment without

under advisement.

taking the matter

From the record of the case there are numerous

issues of fact that emerge from the evidence in the pleading,
certainly enough to suggest issues of fact that further testimony
might show a lack of good faith on the part of Defendants.
Furthermore as relates to the good

faith issue there are

evidences from the testimony of a flagrant arbitrary exercise of
a discretionary duty of a magnitude that ought to suggest that the
Defendants were not performing in accordance with the canons of
good faith.

To deprive the Appellant who represents the public

weal of the opportunity to produce that evidence in a trial, is
contravention of the intent of the good faith exception as applied
to Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12.

The Court should overrule the

Summary Judgment and remand it to the Court for Trial upon the

11

Summary

Judgment and remand it to the Court for Trial upon the

issues.
DATED this

7

day of September, 1990

CUV IN C'NASl
Attorney/for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
to David L. Church, Attorney for Appellant, 51 East 400 South,
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah
DATED this " 7 ^

84111.

day of September, 199
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COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

17-5-12

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 502; C.L.
1917, § 1378; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 1959.

17-5-10, 17-5-11. Repealed.
Repeals. Sections 17-5-10 and 17-5-11 (R.S.
1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 503, 504; C.L. 1917,
§§ 1379, 1380; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5,10,
19-5-11), relating to personal interests of mem-

bers of the board of county commissioners in
county contracts, franchises or licenses, were
repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 128, § 15. For
present provisions, see § 67-16-1 et seq.

17-5-12. Moneys unlawfully paid — Recovery
ing payment.

Restrain-

Whenever any board of county commissioners shall without authority of
law order any money paid for any purpose and such money shall have been
actually paid, or whenever any other county officer has drawn any warrant in
his own favor or in favor of any other person without being authorized thereto
by the board of county commissioners or by law and the same shall have been
paid, the county attorney of such county shall institute suit in the name of the
county against such person or such officer and his official bondsman to recover
the money so paid, and when the money has not been paid on such order or
warrants, the county attorney of such county upon receiving notice thereof
shall commence suit in the name of the county to restrain the payment of the
same; no order of the board of county commissioners shall be necessary in
order to maintain either of such actions.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 506; C.L.
1917, § 1382; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-12.

Cross-References. — Uniform fiscal procedures for counties, § 17-36-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Personal liability of commissioners.
Procedure for bringing action.
Personal liability of commissioners.
County commissioners could not be held personally liable, in absence of fraud or corruption, for unauthorized allowance of claim for
publication of a list of delinquent taxes without
having first invited bids for publication since
the hearing and determination by commissioners of justness or validity of claim in the
question required exercise of judicial, or, at
least, quasi-judicial functions of board. Salt

Lake County v. Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P.
1075 (1911).
Procedure for bringing action.
In an action under this section to recover unlawfully paid money, the county attorney of
the county wherein it was alleged that the
funds were illegally expended must be a party
to bring action, and action must be in the name
of the county. Snyder v. Cook (Utah 1984) 688
P.2d 496.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties § 98.
Key Numbers. — Counties *=» 59.

267

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

17-15-3

17-12-1, Authority and applicable procedure for issuance
of bonds — Application of proceeds — Debt limit.
Except as otherwise provided under Section 17-4-4, the county governing
body may contract a bonded indebtedness in the manner and subject to the
conditions provided under the Utah Municipal Bond Act. The revenue derived
from the sale of bonds shall be applied only to the purpose or purposes specified in the order of the board. If there is any surplus, it shall be applied to the
payment of the bonds. In no event may any county become so indebted to an
amount, including existing indebtedness, exceeding 2% of the fair market
value, as defined under Section 59-2-102, of the taxable property in the county
as computed from the last equalized assessment roll for county purposes prior
to the incurring of the indebtedness.
History: R.S. 1898 & CL. 1907, § 518; L.
1917, ch. 97, § 1; CL. 1917, § 1414; R.S. 1933
& C 1943, 19-10-1; L. 1957, ch. 33, § 1; 1963,
ch. 27, § 1; 1970, ch. 6, § 2; 1985, ch. 165,
I 27; 1987, ch. 4, § 15; 1988, ch. 3, § 64.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, in the first
sentence substituted "county governing body"
for "board of county commissioners", in the
fourth sentence substituted "fair market value,
as established under § 59-2-103," for "reason-

able fair cash value"; and made various stylistic changes throughout the section
The 1988 amendment, effective February 9,
1988, substituted "defined under Section
59-2-102" for "established under Section
59-2-103" in the final sentence
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch 4, § 307 provides that this section has retrospective operation to January 1, 1987
Laws 1988, ch 3, fc 269 provides that the act
"has retrospective operation to January 1,
1988 "

CHAPTER 15
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section
17-15-3

Erection and repair of public
buildings or bridges — Contracts — Bids — Payment and
performance bonds — Retainage escrow

Section
17-15-4
17-15-5
17-15-17

Approval of cost-increase changes
in plans and specifications —
Delegation
Changes or alterations in contract
— Liability of count}
Count} expenses enumerated

17-15-3. Erection and repair of public buildings or bridges
— Contracts — Bids — Payment and performance bonds — Retainage escrow.
(1) (a) Until plans and specifications have been made and adopted by the
county governing body, the governing body may not erect or repair, or
contract for the erection or repair of, any courthouse, jail, hospital, or
other public building or bridge where the expenditure exceeds:
(i) $12,000 in any county of the first or second class,
(ii) $10,000 in any county of the third or fourth class;
(iii) $8,000 in any county m any of the remaining classes
(b) All buildings and bridges shall be erected or repaired by contract let
to the lowest responsible bidder after publication of notice at least once a
week for three consecutive \veeks m a newspaper of general circulation
89

17-15-4

COUNTIES

published in the county, or, if there is no such newspaper, then after
posting such notice for at least 20 days in at least five public places in the
county.
(c) The county governing body may reject any or all bids.
(d) The person to whom any contract to erect or repair buildings and
bridges is awarded shall execute bonds under Sections 14-1-18 and
63-56-38.
(2) (a) Any payment on a contract with a private contractor to erect or
repair buildings and bridges under this section that is retained or withheld shall be placed in an interest bearing account.
(b) The interest shall accrue for the benefit of the contractor and subcontractors to be paid after the project is completed and accepted by the
county governing body.
(c) The contractor shall ensure that any interest accrued on the retainage is distributed by the contractor to subcontractors on a pro rata basis.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 524; C.L. tract" and made minor stylistic changes in
1917, § 1420; L. 1919, ch. 30, § 1; R.S. 1933 & such subsection.
C. 1943,19-11-3; L. 1947, ch. 24, § l;1973,ch.
The 1988 amendment, effective March 10,
23, § 1; 1983, ch. 60, § 15; 1987, ch. 218, § 5; 1988, rewrote this section
1988, ch. 71, § 1.
Applicability. — Laws 1987, ch. 218, § 12
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- prov jdes that Chapter 218 applies only to conment, in the last sentence of Subsection (1) t r a c t s execuied
o n o r a f t e r A p r i l 2 7, 1987, and
So^o^r
^° n u S , U n u § § 1 4 _ 1 j18u a u
to persons and bonds in connection with such
63-56-38 for a bond to be approved by the
board for the faithful performance of such con- contracts.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Public contracts: authority of state
or its subdivision to reject all bids, 52
A.L.R.4th 186
Public contracts: low bidder's monetary relief against state or local agency for nonaward
of contract, 65 A.L.R.4th 93.

Standing of disappointed bidder on public
contract to seek damages under 42 USCS
§ 1983 for public authorities' alleged violation
of bidding procedures, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 904.

17-15-4. Approval of cost-increase changes in plans and
specifications — Delegation.
(1) Whenever the county governing body adopts plans and specifications for
the erection, alteration, construction, or repair of any public building, bridge,
or other public structure, the plans and specifications may not be altered or
changed in any manner that would increase the cost of erecting, altering,
constructing, or repairing the building, bridge, or structure, unless the governing body first orders by unanimous vote that the plans and specifications
be altered or changed.
(2) The governing body may adopt policies and procedures to delegate authority to approve alterations or changes in plans and specifications to a
county employee, including the county engineer, architect, or surveyor, or the
division or department director.
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 525; C.L.
1917, § 1421; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-11-4; L.
1988, ch. 71, § 2.

17-15-8

Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective March 10, 1988, rewrote this
section.

17-15-5. Changes or alterations in contract — Liability of
county.
(1) Whenever the county governing body enters into a contract for the erection, construction, alteration, or repair of any public building, bridge, or other
public structure, the contract may be altered or changed only:
(a) by unanimous vote of the governing body; and
(b) with the consent of the contractor.
(2) Whenever any change or alteration in the contract is ordered:
(a) the particular change or alteration shall be specified in writing; and
(b) the governing body and the contractor shall agree to any cost incurred due to the change or alteration.
(3) (a) The board may adopt policies and procedures to delegate authority
for change order approvals to a county employee, including the county
engineer, architect, surveyor, or the division or department director.
(b) Unless the requirements of this section are met, the county governing body is not liable for any extra work done on the buildings or public
structures.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 526; C.L.
1917, § 1422; R.S. 1933 & C 1943,19-11-5; L.
1988, ch. 71, § 3.

Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective March 10, 1988, rewrote this
section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of
"changed conditions" clause in public works or

construction contract with state or its subdivision, 56 A.L.R.4th 1042.

17-15-6. Purchase of stationery supplies — Notice to bidders.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Standing of disappointed bidder on
public contract to seek damages under 42
USCS § 1983 for public authorities' alleged vi-

olation of bidding procedures, 86 A.L.R. Fed.
904.

17-15-8. Bids for notices and advertising.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Standing of disappointed bidder on
public contract to seek damages under 42
USCS § 1983 for public authorities' alleged vi-
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olation of bidding procedures, 86 A.L.R. Fed.
904.

TITLE 14
CONTRACTORS' BONDS
Chapter
1. Public Contracts.
2. Private Contracts.

CHAPTER 1
PUBLIC CONTRACTS
Section
14-1-13 to 14-1-17. Repealed
14-1-18 Definitions — Application of Procurement Code to payment and
performance bonds

Section
14-1-19
14-1-20

Failure of government entity to obtain payment bond — Right of action — Notice
Preliminary notice requirement

14-1-13 to 14-1-17. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch 218, § 13 repeals
§§ 14-1-13 to 14-1-17, as enacted by Laws
1983, ch 61, §§ 1 to 5, relating to performance

and payment bonds on public projects, effective
April 27, 1987 For present comparable provisions, see §§ 14-1-18, 14-1-19

14-1-18. Definitions — Application of Procurement Code
to payment and performance bonds.
(1) (a) For purposes of this chapter, "political subdivision" means any
county, city, town, school district, public transit district, special district,
redevelopment agency, public corporation, institution of higher education
of the state, public agency of any political subdivision, and, to the extent
provided by law, any other entity which expends public funds for construction.
(b) For purposes of applying Section 63-56-38 to a political subdivision,
"state" includes "political subdivision "
(2) Section 63-56-38 applies to all contracts for the construction, alteration,
or repair of any public building or public work of the state or a political
subdivision of the state
History: C. 1953, 14-1-18, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 218, § 1.
Applicability. — Laws 1987, ch 218, § 12
provides that Chapter 218 applies only to con-

tracts executed on or after April 27, 1987, and
to persons and bonds in connection with such
contracts
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63-56-37. Bid security requirements.
(1) Bid security in amount equal to at least 59c of the amount of the bid
shall be required for all competitive sealed bidding for construction contracts.
Bid security shall be a bond provided by a surety company authorized to do
business in this state, the equivalent in cash, or any other form satisfactory to
the state
(2) When a bidder fails to comply with the requirement for bid security set
forth in the invitation for bids, the bid shall be rejected unless, pursuant to
rules and regulations, it is determined that the failure to comply with the
security requirements is nonsubstantial.
(3) After the bids are opened, they shall be irrevocable for the period specified in the invitation for bids, except as provided in section [Subsection]
63-56-20(6). If a bidder is permitted to withdraw a bid before award, no action
shall be taken against the bidder or the bid security.
History: C. 1953, 63-56-37, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 75, § 1.

63-56-38. Bonds necessary when contract is awarded.
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the following bonds or security shall be delivered to the state and shall become binding on the parties
upon the execution of the contract:
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to
the state; and
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to
the state, for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material to
the contractor or its subcontractors for the performance of the work provided for in the contract.
(2) Rules may provide for waiver of the requirement of a performance or
payment bond where a bond is deemed unnecessary for the protection of the
state.
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract, in respect of which a
payment bond is furnished under this section, who has not been paid in full
within 90 days from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or
material was supplied by the person for whom the claim is made, may sue on
the payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and
may prosecute the action for the amount due the person. Any person having a
contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but no express or implied
contract with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, has a right of
action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to the contractor
and surety company within 90 days from the date on which the last of the
labor was performed or material was supplied by the person for whom the
claim is made. The person shall state in the notice the amount claimed and
the name of the party for whom the labor was performed or to whom the
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material was supplied. The notice shall be served by registered or certified
mail, postage prepaid, on the contractor and surety company at any place the
contractor or surety company maintains an office or conducts business.
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be brought in the district
court of the county in which the construction contract was to be performed. No
suit may be commenced by a claimant under this section more than 180 days
after a surety finally denies that claimant's claim. The obligee named in the
bond need not be joined as a party in the suit.
History: C. 1953, 63-56-38, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 75, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 202, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment deleted "and regulations" after "Rules"
in Subsection (2); substituted "may sue" for
"shall have the right to sue" in the first sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "However" at
the beginning of the second sentence of Subsection (3); inserted "and surety company" in the
second sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "personally or" after "served" in the last sentence
of Subsection (3); substituted "on the contrac-

tor" for "in an envelope addressed to the contractor" in the last sentence of Subsection (3);
inserted "and surety company" and "or surety
company" in the last sentence of Subsection
(3); deleted "but no suit shall be commenced
later than one year from the date on which the
last of the labor was performed or material was
supplied by the person bringing the suit" at the
end of the first sentence of Subsection (4);
added the second sentence of Subsection (4);
and made minor changes in phraseology.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Burden of proof
Timeliness of action
Work performed without contract.
Burden of proof.
In action by materialman on payment bond,
materialman did not have the burden to prove
that the materials furnished were actually delivered to the job site or that they were actually incorporated into the structure, but only
that the materials were furnished in connection with the particular project. City Elec v.
Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053 (Utah
1984)
Timeliness of action.
The appropriate test for determining
whether an action on a payment bond was
brought within the required statutory time period was not the "substantial completion" date;
it was rather whether the material in question

was supplied as a part of the original contract
or for the purpose of correcting defects or making repairs following inspection of the project.
City Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d
1053 (Utah 1984).
Work performed without contract.
Where construction company proceeded to
demolish race track and install a soccer field
for Utah Golden Spikers and state of Utah
without an executed agreement and without
compliance with fc 64-1-4, there was no contract with the 6tate of Utah by which it was
obliged to require the Golden Spikers to furnish performance and payment bonds.
Breitling Bros Constr. v. Utah Golden
Spikers, Inc., 597 P.2d 869 (Utah 1979).

63-56-39. Form of bonds — Effect of certified copy.
The form of the bonds required by this part shall be established by rules and
regulations. Any person may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond
upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and postage, if any. A
certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the contents, execution, and delivery of the original.
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Rule 56

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
B n g h a m Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah GraL Re\ 937
h a n v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am J u r 2d Judgments

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to ha\e been obtained because of attorne\ s
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A L R 3d
^55
^ r e t0 ^
™Uct °J a PP h «"ion f de[ a u h J ^ g m e n t where notice is required only
b
> cuslom> 2 8 A L R J d 1 3 8 3
Failure of part> or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A L R 3d 303
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A L R Fed 190
Ke> Numbers. — Judgment <&=> 92 to 134

* V f l "1 4*9 C J S Judgments ^ 187 to 218
A L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to habiht\ against defaulting defendant 8 A L R 3d
"-Q
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L R 3d
1272
Defaulting
defendant's right to notice and
De
hearing„ as to determination of amount of damhean
a ge s 15 A L R 3d 586

f

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the
id\ of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
t* a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
firiume issue as to the amount of damages
td» Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion und&r^this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
fc[*a] is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
tradings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
Practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro*•**} and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It
1 thereupon make an order specifying the facts t h a t appear without sub1
^'idl controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
^ jr< a^ are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
^ »w established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
orm
'
°^ affidavits; further testimony; d e f e n s e r e q u i r e d . Supportll.
^Pposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
"' 6UC " ^ a c t s a s would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma161

